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Abstract
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the eﬀects of scientific rewards and
commercial incentives on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model
of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how scientific and
commercial incentives aﬀect the allocation of the researcher’s time between research
and development. Although commercialisation incentives reduce the time spent in
research, they might also aﬀect the choice of research projects. Monetary rewards
induce a more intensive search for (ex-post) path-breaking innovations, which are
more likely to be generated through (ex-ante) riskier research programs. We derive
the optimal incentive scheme for a given project in terms of the researcher’s and the
organisation’s objectives.
∗An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “Commercial Incentives in Academia”.
We are grateful to David Pérez-Castrillo, Reinhilde Veugelers, the coeditor and two referees for valuable
discussions and helpful comments. We have also benefited from the comments of seminar participants at
the Jornadas de Economia Industrial at IESE (Barcelona) and at the European Economic Association
conference in Budapest. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (SEJ2006-00538),
Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD 2006-00016), Barcelona GSE Research Network and of the Government of
Catalonia (2005SGR00836) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, City University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB,
UK. E-mail: a.banal-estanol@city.ac.uk.
‡Corresponding author: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Departament d’Economia i d’Història
Econòmica, Fac CCEE (Edifici B), 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain. E-mail: ines.macho@uab.es
1
1 Introduction
The industrial base of advanced economies relies heavily on research and development
(R&D). Scientific and technological innovation creates competitiveness, sustainable eco-
nomic growth and welfare. The prominent role of universities and R&D intensive firms as
key providers of scientific knowledge implies that any change in the research environment
is (and should be) widely debated.
The introduction of the Bayh-Dole act, which gave American universities the right to
own and license inventions emanating from federally funded research, coincided with a
dramatic increase in the number of university patents, licensing agreements and revenues.1
Many people have seen this surge as a great benefit to society. Others, however, have
expressed concerns about the possibility that commercial rewards might be aﬀecting the
choice of research projects, “skewing” research from basic towards more applied (Florida
and Cohen, 1999).2 Still, many directors of technology transfer oﬃces believe that many
inventions with commercial potential are not disclosed to their oﬃces (Jensen et al.,
2003). Faculty involvement in development is necessary for commercial success (Jensen
and Thursby, 2001) and researchers might not want to take time away from research.
Even if they have always had a clearer commercialisation objective, research-intensive
firms also face the problem of providing adequate incentives for both research and devel-
opment. The long-run level of research productivity in pharmaceutical drug discovery,
1The 86 universities responding to the Association of University Technology Managers survey in 1991
and 1998, for example, reported an increase in patent applications of 176 percent and licenses executed
of 131 percent (Jensen et al., 2003). In recent years, in a large number of EU countries an increase in
patenting has also been closely following the transfer of ownership of patents to universities (Geuna and
Nesta, 2006).
2After the costs are recovered, the royalty income is divided between the university’s transfer oﬃce,
the faculty members listed as inventors and their departments. In many of these agreements the faculty
can receive as much as 50% of the total royalty revenue. Lach and Schankerman (2008) provide strong
empirical support for the importance of inventor’s royalty shares for university performance in terms of
inventions and license income. Survey results by Blumenthal et al. (1986) also indicate that faculty
members whose research is supported by the industry are four times more likely than faculty without
such support to report that their choices of research topics have been aﬀected by the chance that the
results would have commercial application.
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for example, depends on the eﬀort devoted towards the solution of fundamental scien-
tific problems and the development of potentially marketable drugs (Cockburn et al.,
1999). In the late 1970s, the pharmaceutical industry experienced a significant exogenous
shock to the technology of drug discovery which induced firms to provide high-powered
incentives for research, based on scientific publications. More recently, R&D managers of
large research-intensive firms have claimed that they are facing, as universities, greater
pressures to “sell” R&D services to their customers (Zettelmeyer and Hauser, 1995).
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the eﬀects of scientific and commercial
incentives on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher
capable to obtain innovative ideas. In each period, the researcher might decide to un-
dertake new research, generating thus a new idea. Each idea has both scientific and
potential commercial value, in line with recent evidence that shows that a single piece of
knowledge may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications
(the “Pasteur’s quadrant”).3 Alternatively, she may decide to develop prior research into
a commercially valuable innovation. If she does so, however, the researcher forgoes the
opportunity of undertaking new research and therefore of receiving a new idea in that
period.
We analyse, in the first place, how scientific and market incentives aﬀect the allocation
of researcher’s time between research and development. Not surprisingly, higher commer-
cial rewards induce the researcher to develop more and therefore to spend less time on
research. We argue, however, that the introduction of commercial objectives also aﬀect
the choice of research projects. At least according to one measure, researchers should
have incentives to conduct more basic research, contrary to what the “skewing problem”
would suggest. Indeed, we show that the introduction of commercial rewards prompts
researchers to increase the search for high-quality path-breaking (ex-post) ideas, which
are more likely to be generated through (ex-ante) riskier research programs. Although
3This line of research started with Stokes (1997). The canonical example is the French chemist Louis
Pasteur, who, acting as a consultant for the French wine industry, confirmed the germ theory of disease.
Murray (2002) provides a more recent case study of the “oncomouse”, a discovery that was both a product
and fundamentally aﬀected the pace and direction of genetic cancer research. Following Murray (2002)
and Murray and Stern (2007) we posit that papers and patents encode the same piece of knowledge.
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risk is associated with all forms of research, high uncertainty is an inherent characteristic
of basic research. As Nelson (1959) states in his seminal paper, “the line between basic
scientific research and applied scientific research is hard to draw. There is a continuous
spectrum of scientific activity. Moving from the applied-science end of the spectrum to the
basic-science end, the degree of uncertainty about the results of specific research projects
increases”. As documented by Zettelmeyer and Hauser (1995), managers of R&D firms
also think that basic research is the most uncertain one.
We also address the problem of providing incentives for research workers. We char-
acterise the optimal incentive scheme as a function of the employee and the employer’s
characteristics. Researchers are not only driven by monetary rewards but also by peer
recognition and the “puzzle” joy (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Although universities and
research-intensive firms have diﬀerent objectives, both of them can now use commercial
and scientific incentives to motivate their researchers and to induce them to spend an
optimal amount of time in research, on the one hand, and in development, on the other.
We show that organisations should use a high level of commercial incentives for re-
searchers that have very strong and for those that have very weak intrinsic preferences for
research. For those with strong preferences, the organisation needs to induce development
while for those with weak intrinsic preferences for research the organisation needs to pro-
vide incentives to work. As a consequence, even for non-scientific oriented organisations,
it can be optimal to hire an intermediate scientific-oriented researcher. Similarly, it might
be optimal to prohibit or limit publications of researchers with strong intrinsic preferences
for research.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that characterises the optimal
provision of commercial and scientific incentives. We believe that this is also the first
analysis of the impact of the introduction of commercial incentives on the choice of research
projects in academia.4 Lacetera (2006) compares the incentives of academic and industrial
4It is important to note that we are concentrating on early-stage research. Aghion et al. (2005),
instead, study the respective advantages and disadvantages of academia and the private sector at dif-
ferent stages and show that university researchers are more eﬀective at an early stage. Using a closely
related model Lacetera (2008) studies firms’ determinants to outsource research projects to academic
organisations, focusing instead on duration and breadth.
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researchers to perform additional, cost-reducing research into a given project prior to
commercialisation. In his paper, the unit of analysis is a single project and once the
project is completed, no other projects are available. In our model, the researcher does
not choose whether to perform more research into the project. Rather, she faces the trade-
oﬀ between commercialising the current idea and dropping it and venturing into a new
research project of uncertain quality.5 In this sense, ours is complementary to his paper.
He finds that a greater focus on commercialisation can lead to additional research into the
projects and we find that the introduction of commercialisation can lead to more intensive
research for ex-post path-breaking innovations. Thursby et al. (2005) analyse the impact
of licensing on the time spent on basic and applied research in a life cycle context. They
show that basic research does not need to suﬀer from licensing if one assumes that basic
and applied research eﬀort are complementary.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model and Section 3 studies the optimal allocation of time between research and devel-
opment. Section 4 analyses the choice of research projects. Section 5 characterises the
optimal contract. Section 6 analyses a finite version of our basic model that allows us
to study deadline eﬀects. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Basic Model
Consider the following repeated model of a risk-neutral researcher. In each period, she
spends her time either doing research or being involved in further development of prior
knowledge. If she pursues research she obtains, at the end of the period, an “idea” of
random quality q, drawn from an independent and identical distribution F (q) with density
f(q), expected value q and support [0, Q]. As stressed by this formulation, the outcome
of any research project is inherently uncertain.
5Several papers have analysed the relations between the university and the industry. Macho-Stadler
et al. (1996) and Jensen and Thursby (2001) for example analyse the optimal contract between the
university and the company. Banal-Estañol et al. (2008) estimate the impact of industry collaboration
on academic research output.
5
In line with the recent literature in the economics of science (Murray and Stern, 2007),
the research output has both scientific value and potential market value. The scientific
content is publishable in a scientific journal and it does not jeopardise further patent
rights.6 The researcher derives a utility of αq, where α denotes the marginal benefit of
the quality of the publication to the researcher. This parameter may reflect the puzzle joy
in addition to tenure, peer recognition concerns and the possibility to obtain monetary
prizes or funding from public grants.
In the following period, the researcher may undertake a new research project and
obtain, at the end of the period, a new idea. Alternatively, she might decide to spend
time in the commercial development of the previous period’s output. This might involve
patenting and finding and collaborating with a licensing firm to develop a commercially
valuable innovation. Or, it could consist in doing consultancy, in being involved in a
spin-oﬀ or in spending time in any activity related to the scientific output that would
allow her to obtain extra financial gains from the discovery.
At the end of the development period, the commercial value of an output of quality
q is µq − A.7 The parameter µ may be linked to the discipline; academic research in
engineering, for example, may have a higher µ than in physical sciences. The parameter
A reflects the cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product or, in the case of
academic research, the diﬃculty of finding a company interested in licensing inventions at
this early stage of development. This cost should be net of any commercial value which is
6We discuss at the end of Section 3 what happens if academic publication is delayed by commer-
cialisation. Further, publications do not have strategic eﬀects in our setup. If there was competition
between researchers, publishing could also be used as a strategic instrument to aﬀect the R&D race (see
for example Bar, 2006).
7We assume that when sold the quality of the innovation is verifiable. The literature on markets for
technology suggests the use of a menu of fixed fees and royalties or equity to signal the quality of the
invention or to separate bad applications of the technology from good ones (Gallini and Wright, 1990,
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991, and Beggs, 1992). We also assume in the basic setup that the
applicability factors µ and A are certain. It would be equivalent to assume that they are random, with
independently distributributions whose realisations are not observed until the end of the development
period. In Section 4 we discuss the case in which the researcher observes µ at the end of the research
period. In Section 6 we analyse the case in which A is observed at the end of the research period.
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independent from the quality of the idea, which would be subtracted from A.8 We assume
that the commercial value is an increasing function of the quality of the ideas (i.e. µ > 0)
and that the ideas of the lowest quality do not have commercial value (i.e. A > 0), while
the ones of the highest quality do have commercial value (µQ > A).
When selling the innovation the researcher receives a share s (∈ (0, 1)) of the commer-
cial benefits of the innovation.9 This can be interpreted as the share that the institution
is paying to the scientist or as the revenue from commercialisation net of the overhead
charge, or Compton Tax, when the researcher is the residual claimant.10
As the survey results of Jensen et al. (2003) confirm, even academic researchers need
to be involved in development to ensure commercial success. We assume that without this
period of development, the idea does not have any commercial value. By being involved in
development, however, the researcher forgoes the opportunity of undertaking new research
and receiving a new idea in that period. In our setup, thus, the conflict between scientific
reward and commercial gains only appears in terms of the time that development subtracts
from conducting research. Research is motivated both for fundamental scientific interest
and commercial gain (pertaining thus to the “Pasteur’s quadrant”). Moreover, the quality
of the publications and the quality of the technology developed are positively correlated.
This model is infinitely repeated and time is discounted by δ (∈ (0, 1)).11 An advantage
of this formulation is that our results are not distorted by the existence of a final date.
This model, however, is not dynamic in the sense that there are no diﬀerences between
periods, i.e., there is neither learning from past research nor accumulation of capabilities
over time. While these dimensions are important, the main part of the paper aims, as
8In the paper we assume that these additive benefits do not outweight the costs to avoid the possibility
that the worst commercial ideas are developed. Relaxing this assumption, though, would only create an
extra case in Proposition 2 below.
9If the development period consists in being involved in a spin-oﬀ, A could be interpreted as the
sunk-cost of creating the spin-oﬀ and s as the shares received by the researcher. This is consistent with
the contracts used for university spin-oﬀs (see for example, Macho-Stadler et al., 2007).
10As explained in Beath et al. (2003), Karl Compton, president of the MIT between 1930 and 1948,
was concerned about the damage of consultancy on the MIT’s reputation and research. He decided to
regulate the amount of consulting by taxing consultancy income at a rate of 50%.
11An infinite horizon setups is indeed appropriate if after each period the researcher believes that the
model will continue for an additional period with some probability.
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a first step, at studying the simplest situation where the researchers are confronted with
the research versus development decision. In Section 6, we consider a finite version of our
basic model, which allows us to study deadline eﬀects (as would appear if for example
the researcher is close to retirement) and, at the same time, to consider non stationary
research and development outcomes.
3 Time Allocation
After obtaining an idea q in the previous period the researcher decides, at the beginning
of the new period, whether to develop this idea further or to work on a new research
project. Before characterising the optimal allocation of time as a function of the exogenous
parameters, we first state the optimal decision as a function of an exogenous “research
continuation value” V . We define V as the discounted present expected value of the utility
stream of a researcher at the beginning of a period in which she does research.
Lemma 1 For any research continuation value V , there is a unique q◦(V ) such that the
researcher will not develop if and only if q ≤ q◦(V ).
For any exogenous continuation value, the researcher switches to a new research project
unless the output of the previous period has enough commercial prospects. We are now
ready to characterise the cutoﬀ q◦ and present value V as a function of the exogenous
parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < q◦, where q◦ is defined as follows:
(i) q◦ = Q when αq ≥ s (µQ−A) .
(ii) s (µq◦ −A) = αq + δsµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x) when αq < s (µQ−A) .
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
1−δ
h
αq + δsµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q
◦) dF (x)
i
.
Intuitively, if the scientific value of the average publication is, in monetary terms,
higher than the payment from the best innovation, the researcher will never develop an
idea (case i). If this is not the case, then the researcher will develop her best ideas while
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dropping the worse ones (case ii). The quality in which the researcher is indiﬀerent is
such that the monetary reward after development is equal to the expected opportunity
cost of a period’s time; namely, the scientific reward of the average publication plus the
expected monetary reward from an innovation derived from a research output of higher
quality.
This proposition allows us to pin down which changes in the exogenous parameters
induce the researcher to develop more often; that is, when the region of case (i) (in which
she never develops) shrinks and/or when the threshold within the region of case (ii) (in
which she might develop) is lower.
Corollary 3 The researcher develops more often, when
(i) the applicability factor, µ, increases;
(ii) the net costs of turning an innovation into a commercial product, A, decrease;
(iii) the discount factor, δ, decreases;
(iv) the marginal utility of the quality of the publication, α, decreases;
(v) the share of the benefits received by the researcher, s, increases.
As one would anticipate, a higher marginal commercial value of the innovation, µ,
and a lower cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product, A, induce more
development. Indeed, the empirical results by Thursby and Thursby (2007) confirm that
the probability that a researcher discloses in a given year is higher in more applied fields
such as engineering and in fields in which the results are in strong demand by the industry
such as biological sciences.
More interestingly, if the future carries little value (δ low), then researchers do not lose
much from developing in this period and foregoing the possibility of obtaining a better
research outcome. As a result, they develop more often. An alternative interpretation of
the discount rate δ is the rate at which ideas are obtained. The corollary implies that a
more prolific researcher (with a high δ) should be more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Although she might end up developing more or less in total, the commercial value of her
average innovation should definitely be higher.
Also intuitively, stronger commercial incentives (a higher s) and a lower emphasis in
publications (a lower α) induce more development. Although the combination (α, s) is
9
exogenous to the researcher, the organisation determines s and can also aﬀect α, oﬀering
for example publication prizes. As we argue in Section 5, the optimal combination depends
on the organisation objectives.
4 Project Selection
We now turn to the controversial question of how the introduction of commercial remu-
neration aﬀects the choice of research projects. As we shall see in this section, whether
the researcher would choose more basic or more applied projects hinges crucially on how
basicness is defined. As argued in the introduction one of the potential diﬀerences be-
tween basic and applied projects is that basic projects are riskier than applied projects
(Nelson, 1959). But, another potential diﬀerence is that the outcomes of basic projects
might, in expected terms, be more diﬃcult to commercialise and carry higher scientific
reward. We should consider each of these two distinctions in turn.12
4.1 Level of Risk
According to Nelson (1959), when moving from the applied-science to the basic-science end
of the spectrum, the degree of uncertainty about the results of specific research projects
increases. In what follows, we will show that according to this distinction, researchers
will be more willing to choose projects that are more basic in nature when they receive a
share of the financial profits from commercialisation. In order to isolate the eﬀects of this
diﬀerence, suppose that the researcher can costlessly choose the level of risk of her research
projects, assuming that the mean and the support of the distribution are identical.
Proposition 4 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions induces re-
searchers to select riskier projects. By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more
reluctant to develop a given outcome, although they might develop more or less in expected
terms.
12Other distinctions are also possible. Basic research projects can have a broader set of applications
or, similar to our second definition, be characterised by a lower probability of commercial success.
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Figure 1: Researcher’s utility in a given period (for a given V) as a function of the quality
of the idea.
The intuition behind the preference for the risky project follows from the fact that
the researcher acts as if she was risk-loving with respect to the quality of the output.
As we can see in Figure 1, researcher’s utility as a function of the output quality is a
convex function. Indeed, for a given V , the utility is the maximum of two aﬃne functions
that represent the value from continuing doing research (αq + δV ) and the value from
development (αq + δs [µq −A] + δ2V ). The latter is steeper because better output has
higher development value. The former has a higher intercept because the researcher
obtains a new idea sooner. As shown in Proposition 2, as long as the remuneration for
the best innovation is high enough, the two lines cross at some point qo.
By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Indeed, they are more likely to obtain a better idea in the next period and therefore they
are more willing to drop the current one. As shown in Figure 2, though, they might end
up developing more ideas in expected terms. Although F+(x) is a mean preserving spread
of F−(x) and therefore the threshold for the former is higher (q+o > q−o), the ex-ante
probability of developing is also higher (F+(q+o) < F−(q−o)).
Although the scientific and commercial rewards were assumed to be linearly increasing
in the quality of the output, this result should hold more generally. Indeed, the intro-
duction of commercial rewards induce the researcher to select between two increasing
11
Figure 2: Distribution F−(·) and a mean preserving spread, F+(·) (Area X=Area Y ).
functions. Assume that the commercial value of an idea of quality q is µ(q)q. Given that
the best innovations have much higher value than intermediate ones, µ(q) would typically
be not constant as in our model but increasing. This would make the researcher even
more risk-loving than with no rewards from technology transfer. Further, the fact that
the researcher selects riskier projects than with no commercial rewards should hold if the
value of publications has the form α(q)q for any α(q) and not only when α(q) is constant.
Indeed, although she might not always act as if she was risk-loving she would exhibit more
risk-loving behaviour than before the introduction of commercial rewards.
4.2 Scientific and Commercial Value
Another potential diﬀerence between basic and more applied research is that the outcomes
of applied projects can be more easily commercialised or, in other words, the net costs
A of turning the innovation into a commercial product are lower. Also, peer recognition
and the expected value of publication (measured by the parameter α) can be lower for
more applied projects. The next proposition confirms that, according to this distinction,
researchers will be more likely to choose applied projects in the presence of commercial
incentives.
Proposition 5 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions is conducive
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to a selection of projects with lower costs of development and lower scientific value. By
choosing these projects, researchers spend more time in development and less in research.
Although the eﬀects of each of the two definitions are diﬀerent, the definitions are not
mutually exclusive. If basicness is characterised by both higher risk and higher devel-
opment costs and high scientific value, commercial rewards might induce a shift towards
more applied or more basic. Of course, if more applied projects have much lower develop-
ment costs, then researchers would choose more applied research projects even if they are
less risky. On the other hand, researchers would choose research projects that are riskier if
the diﬀerence in development costs is not large. All in all, the introduction of commercial
incentives should not necessarily “skew” research towards more applied projects.13
4.3 Extensions
Our basic model assumes that the development factor is certain. But, as mentioned in
Footnote 7, it also allows for the possibility that it is random, as long as the realisation
is not observed until the end of the period of development.14 Both are equivalent given
that only the expectation (and not the realisation) is relevant for the time allocation
decision. It might be, however, that the researcher realises the commercial value of a
piece of knowledge at the end of the research period, when she also realises its quality.
Then, as shown formally in Banal-Estañol and Macho-Stadler (2007), the ideas that have
turned out to have high commercial value are more likely to be developed. But, still, the
introduction of remuneration induces researchers to choose riskier projects in terms of
quality. Furthermore, researchers would also tend to choose projects that have a riskier
commercialisation value.
In the basic model, we also assumed that the decision to develop did not aﬀect the
timing of the publications. However, there is evidence that publications of results that
13An important consideration for social welfare, which is beyond the reach of our model, is whether
several researchers will be pushed to select the same project. This might still be optimal if the duplication
of eﬀorts increases the likehood of having a good discovery.
14Other papers have also analysed project selection when projects diﬀer on their variance. In Cabral
(2003), for example, two firms competing in R&D have to choose between two projects, one of which is
a mean-preserving spread of the other.
13
have been subject of a patent application might be delayed (Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
Suppose that if the researcher develops, then she cannot publish the scientific content
until the end of the development period. The researcher would develop less often, given
that the delay makes development less attractive. But, as we also show in detail in Banal-
Estañol and Macho-Stadler (2007), the results are qualitative the same. The introduction
of commercial incentives still induces research that is riskier. The eﬀect, however, is
weaker than without delay.
5 Management of R&D Activities
Research organisations need to motivate researchers and to ensure that they allocate
an “optimal” amount of time to research and development. In this section, we analyse
the optimal incentive scheme of an organisation that can use commercial and scientific
incentives. We assume that the researcher works in a predetermined pool of projects and
thus abstract from the project selection dimension. In contrast, we extend our analysis
to allow for the possibility that, in addition to the time allocation decision, the researcher
has the possibility of not exerting any eﬀort.
Notice first that research organisations diﬀer, to a great extent, as to which importance
they attach to scientific results versus commercial value. Research intensive companies,
for example, are more likely to prioritise commercial value than universities or other
public research institutions. But universities’ preferences might also diﬀer, depending
on their field of specialisation and on the institutional environment.15 We denote the
relative weight that the organisation attaches to publications as ρ ∈ [0,∞) whereas the
(normalised) weight attached to the organisation’s share of the commercial applications
is 1.16 Higher values of ρ imply a higher concern for scientific reputation or prestige from
successful research and a lower importance of commercial profits.
Suppose that the organisation pays the researcher through a contract (s, α+), where
s is her share of the commercial revenues and α+ is a prize (in monetary terms) awarded
15The Bayh-Dole Act has pushed some universities to encourage technology licensing and commercial
arrangements and to include them in their strategic plans (e.g., Iowa University).
16We are omitting the uninteresting case in which the organisation only cares about publications.
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to the quality of the research, in addition to her intrinsic puzzle joy or peer recognition,
αo.17 That is, we decompose the marginal benefit of the quality of the publications as
α = α+ + αo. As a result, a given researcher’s α depends on the organisation she works
for. As we did for the researcher, denote the discounted present expected profits for the
organisation at the beginning of a period in which the researcher does research as B.
Lemma 6 The discounted present expected value B for the organisation is
(i) B(α+, s) =
ρ− α+
1− δ q if q
◦ = Q,
(ii) B(α+, s) =
(1− s)
s
V +
s(ρ+ αo)− (α+ + αo)
s (1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])q if q
◦ < Q,
where q◦ and V are defined in Proposition 2.
Suppose also that in each period if the researcher works, either in research or develop-
ment, she incurs a cost c. But she can also not perform any activity at a 0 cost. If she is
in a research period she devotes eﬀort, assuming she will also do so in the future, if and
only if her expected utility from working, V − c, is greater than her expected utility from
shirking, 0+ δV. Consequently, the “incentive to provide eﬀort” constraint (IE hereafter)
can be written as ¡
αo + α+
¢
q + δsµ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) ≥ c, (IE)
where q◦ (to which we will refer as the “time allocation” constraint or TA) is again defined
in Proposition 2.
Figure 3 represents both constraints. The time allocation constraint for any q◦ is
represented by the isolevel dashed curves. The isolevel curve for q◦ = Q, in which the
researcher never develops, is the thick squared region. The set of contracts satisfying
the IE is the shadowed area. For each cost level c, the IE constraint implicitly defines
a family of contracts (s, α+) that induces the researcher to provide eﬀort. Commercial
and scientific incentives are substitutes and therefore the boundary, in terms of α+, is a
non-increasing function of s. By providing higher research incentives, the organisation can
oﬀer a lower share of the commercial profits. If α+ is high enough, it is not necessary to
17Note that in what follows we can ignore the researcher’s participation constraint because it can be
guaranteed through a fixed transfer, if necessary.
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Figure 3: The isolevel dashed curves represent the time allocation constraint (TA) for a
given qo. The isolevel curve for q◦ = Q is the thick squared region. The shadowed area
represents the contracts satisfying the incentive to provide eﬀort constrant (IE).
increase s further, though. If α+ ≥ c/q − αo the researcher would provide eﬀort for any
s, thanks to the scientific value of the publications. And, if c/q ≤ αo she would provide
eﬀort for any s and α+, thanks to the intrinsic value from scientific research.
The organisation’s problem is to choose the optimal contract (α+, s) in order to max-
imize B subject to the the IE, TA and the feasible intervals for α+ and s,
max
s,α+
B(α+, s) (1)
s.t. TA, IE, s ∈ [0, 1] and α+ ≥ 0.
In order to present the solution of the problem, let us denote qe the stopping rule that
maximizes the total surplus, B + V. Further, define se and α+e the contract that induce
qe and satisfy IE with equality (this pair might not be within the feasible bounds of α+
and s). When the stopping rule induces the commercialisation of some ideas, qe < Q, the
contract (α+e, se) is unique. However, when it generates no commercialisation, qe = Q,
(α+e, se) is a set of contracts. If se is below a certain level no commercialisation occurs
(see Proposition 2) and all the contracts are equivalent.
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Proposition 7 The optimal incentive scheme (α+∗, s∗) satisfies:
(i) For c ≤ αoq then, α+∗ = 0 and 0 ≤ s∗ ≤ 1.
(ii) For c > αoq then
(ii.1) α+∗ = α+e and s∗ = se if se ≤ 1 and α+e ≥ 0,
(ii.2) α+∗ = αc and s∗ = 1 if se > 1,
(ii.3) α+∗ = 0 and sc ≤ s∗ ≤ 1 if se ≤ 1 and α+e < 0,
where αc ≡ (c− δµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x))/q−αo and sc ≡ (c− αoq) /(δµ
R Q
qo (x− qo) dF (x)).
Figure 3 helps to understand the results in Proposition 7. An organisation can obtain
the same revenue at a lower cost by decreasing s and α+ simultaneously while keeping q◦
constant. Hence, (α+∗, s∗) has to be such that IE is binding or it is in a corner solution
for α+ or s. If c ≤ αoq (case i) any contract satisfies IE and therefore IE is never binding.
The organisation chooses a contract on the horizontal axis, i.e. it does not allocate extra
incentives to scientific results (α+ = 0) and sets the share s in order to maximise B given
TA and α+ = 0. If the organisation is interested in inducing research only, the optimal
contract has zero shares for the researcher. But if the organisation is also interested
in inducing development then the optimal contract will include positive shares for the
researcher to induce her to commercialise sometimes.
If c > αoq, and the socially optimal stopping rule can be achieved with a feasible
contract satisfying IE, then this contract will be the solution (case ii.1). If this contract
is not feasible (in the sense that α+e < 0 or se /∈ [0, 1]), the organisation will choose
a contract in the boundaries of the space of feasible parameters, either by giving all
the commercial rewards to the researcher (case ii.2) or by giving her no extra scientific
incentives (case ii.3). In the latter, the organisation will again choose the optimal s in
order to maximise B given TA and α+ = 0.
In order to illustrate how the optimal incentive scheme changes with the parameters,
we now present, in Table 1, a numerical example based a pool of ideas following a uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 1] with µ = 2, A = 0, δ = 0.4. The first two blocks show
how the optimal contract, the organisation’s profits and the stopping rule (rows 3 to
5) change with αo (row 2). Block 1 considers an organisation exclusively interested in
commercial revenue and Block 2 an organisation that weights commercial revenue and
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scientific reputation equally. Given that c = 0.1, we are in case (i) of Proposition 7 if
αo ≥ 0.2 and in case (ii) if αo < 0.2.
αo(ρ = 0, c = 0.1) αo(ρ = 1, c = 0.1) ρ (αo= 0.1, c = 0.1) c (αo= 0.1, ρ = 0)
0.5 0.2 0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0 2 ≥ 4 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.4
α+∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0.08 0.1 0 0 0 0.2
s∗ 0.27 0.15 0.34 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.09 ≤ 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.21 1
B∗ 0.30 0.38 0.32 1.01 1.06 0.96 0.38 1.71 3.25 0.42 0.42 0.38 −0.12
q◦ 0.50 0.40 0.15 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.2 0.5 1 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.2
Table 1: Optimal contract (α+∗, s∗), maximum profits (B∗) and stopping rule (qo) for a uniform
distribution over [0, 1] (F (x) = x) with µ = 2, A = 0 and δ = 0.4.
An organisation that is not concerned with scientific reputation (ρ = 0) will not
use research prizes to induce eﬀort. The incentives to work will be induced with the
commercialisation shares, which also give incentives to develop. An organisation that has
the same interest in commercialisation and in scientific reputation (ρ = 1) will use both
commercial and scientific incentives to motivate a researcher with low intrinsic interest
to publish (last column of the second block). Interestingly, both types of organisation
use a high level of commercialisation shares for high but also for low levels of intrinsic
research interest. For high levels of αo, the organisation needs to use a high s to induce
development while for low levels of αo, the organisation needs to use a high share to
provide incentives to work.
As a consequence, the organisation’s profits at the optimum have an inverted-U-shape
with respect to αo. This means that, even non-scientific oriented organisations (ρ = 0)
can find it optimal to hire a scientific oriented researcher (αo > 0). A researcher who is
too much research-driven, though, can also lower profits.
If it were possible to lower αo, via a prohibition of research related activities that
oﬀer exposure to other scientists, it might be optimal to do so. For example, a commer-
cially oriented organisation (ρ = 0) increase profits by reducing the researchers’ intrinsic
interests to publish from αo = 0.5 until αo = 0.2 or αo = 0.18
18The organisation can in principle do this at no cost. We are not proposing to use a negative α+ but
18
The third block highlights how the optimal contract changes with ρ (second row).
A highly research oriented institution (high ρ), may decide to avoid commercialisation
in equilibrium (e.g. if ρ ≥ 4 in our example). The researcher receives extra recognition
for scientific output but she is induced to not commercialise. Comparing the stopping
rules, more commercial oriented institutions will intuitively induce a lower threshold, q◦.19
But, even for the organisations that are exclusively interested in commercial revenue, it
is never optimal to induce the researcher to develop every idea. Poor ideas (low q) are
better abandoned.
The fourth block illustrates how the optimal contract changes with c (second row).
If c = 0.02 (first column) any contract satisfies the incentive to exert eﬀort constraint.
The optimal contract corresponds to the case (i) of Proposition 7 in which s∗ is interior.
For c = 0.06 the organisation could choose the s that makes the incentive to exert eﬀort
(IE) binding, sc. However it does not. It is still optimal to choose the same contract
as in the first column (which would now satisfy s∗ > sc) (case ii.3). If c = 0.1, the IE
is binding in equilibrium and the contract includes a share s that decreases with c (case
ii.1). Finally, if the costs are very high (c = 0.4) even for s = 1 the incentive constraint
to exert eﬀort would not be satisfied unless α+ > 0 (case ii.2). The researcher keeps
all the revenue from commercialisation and, in addition, she has to receive a prize for
publications in order to have incentives to work. If there are not any other benefits from
hiring the researcher (except those included in B), the organisation might be better oﬀ
not hiring the researcher, given that B∗ < 0.
6 Retirement Eﬀects
In this section we consider a three-period version of our basic model, which allows us
to study deadline eﬀects (that would appear if for example the researcher is close to
retirement). At the same time, it enables us to consider non stationary research and
development outcomes. We allow also for the possibility that the net costs of development,
to make it more diﬃcult for the researcher to enjoy pure research results.
19According to our definition of B, it does not make sense to compare the absolute profits B∗ for
diﬀerent values of ρ since an organization with high ρ generates more profits for any contract.
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which include the diﬀerence between the scientific and the additional commercial value (on
top of the random quality of the idea), are random, with positive or negative realisations.20
Formally, the quality and the net costs of development, qi and Ai, are uncertain at the
beginning and realised, at the same time, at the end of each research period. Although
the game has three periods, the third period may be diﬀerent depending on whether the
researcher spent the second one in research or in development. Accordingly, allowing past
experience to matter, we denote the nodal points as i, i = 1, 2, 3, 30. We assume that the
variables qi and Ai are distributed independently according to Gi(q) and Hi(A) on the
support [0, Qi] and
£
Ai, Ai
¤
, respectively, where Ai < 0 and Ai > 0. Similarly, we denote
the researcher’s marginal benefit of the quality of research and her share of commercial
revenues in period i as αi and si, respectively.
In this model, the researcher needs to take a time allocation decision at most twice,
after the first research outcome, (q1, A1), and if she decides to undertake research in the
second period, after the second research outcome, (q2, A2).
Proposition 8 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality and net costs of development are such that Ai > bAi(qi) where bAi(·) is
implicitly defined as
s3(µz − bA2(z)) = α30q30 and s2(µz − bA1(z)) = K( bA2(·)) ,
where K( bA2(·)) is defined as
α2q2− δα30q30 + δs3
Z Q2
0
Z bA2(x)
A2
(µx− y)dH2(y)dG2(x)+ δα3q3
Z Q2
0
(1−H2( bA2(x))dG2(x).
The first condition shows that an increase in s3 or a decrease in α30q30 enlarge the
set of combinations of quality and net costs for which the researchers develops after the
second research period. Similarly, the second condition shows that an increase in s2 or in
α3q3 will also enlarge the region in which the researcher stops after the first period.
Corollary 9 In a stationary environment (αi = α, si = s, Hi(y) = H(y), Fi(y) = F (y),
for i = 1, 2, 3, 30), the researcher is more likely to commercialise in the third period than
in the second.
20This takes into account innovations with high scientific value and high commercial value, or having
high scientific value and low commercial value, and so on.
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Indeed, in the last period the researcher develops more because she does not have the
extra loss from losing a potentially good idea. In Corollary 3 (Section 3), we show in the
infinite model that the development threshold decreases if the marginal utility of scientific
publications decreases. Assuming that the marginal utility decreases with tenure and age,
we can argue that this is consistent with the fact that disclosure increases with tenure and
age, at least until the middle ages (Thursby and Thursby, 2007). This corollary confirms
this intuition in a more direct way.
We now turn to the changes in the level of risk. For simplicity, we concentrate on the
case in which q is a random variable and A is a parameter (the conclusions for the case
in which q is a parameter and A is random are similar). Suppose further that µ = 1 and
A1 = A2 = 0. Notice that a mean preserving spread of G3(q) and G30(q) does not aﬀect
the time allocation decisions. A mean preserving spread of G1(q) does not aﬀect the time
allocation decision either but will aﬀect the present expected value V . As we can see in
Proposition 8, G2(q) aﬀects the time allocation behavior at the beginning of the second
period but not at the beginning of the third.
The next proposition shows first that the result obtained in Section 4 is also true here.
Namely, the introduction of commercial rewards induce researchers to choose projects
that have a higher level of risk. Here, we are also able to analyse the marginal incentives
to take riskier projects when the share of commercial profits, s2 and/or s3, increase.
Proposition 10 Consider µ = 1 and A1 = A2 = 0. The introduction of remuneration
for commercial inventions induces researchers to select riskier projects. Moreover, the
incentives to select ideas from distributions that are mean preserving spreads of each other:
i) increase with s2, and increase with s3 if and only if qo1 > q¯1, in period 1,
ii) decrease with s2, and increase with s3, in period 2.
This result shows that the eﬀects of the researcher’s share of commercial profits on the
incentives to take riskier projects in period 1 or 2 are not clear-cut. When the researcher
chooses the same pool of ideas in both periods (a research profile in which she has to
invest) and the shares change simultaneously in both periods (e.g., if s2 = s3), the eﬀects
are combined and it is diﬃcult to reach a conclusion about the direction. This explains
why in the infinite model analysing the tendency to select a riskier pool of projects as a
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function of the share s is diﬃcult to analyse without having particular functional forms.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the provision of adequate incentives for university and firm researchers.
Public and private research institutions can use commercial and scientific incentives to
motivate researchers and induce them to spend an optimal amount of time in research,
on the one hand, and in development, on the other.
To understand researchers’ behaviour, we build a simple repeated model of a researcher
that can choose between undertaking new research or developing prior research into a
commercially valuable innovation. We show that the researcher should pursue a new
research project unless the quality of the outcome has enough commercial prospects to
compensate a delay in undertaking new research. The opportunity costs of development
and commercialisation include not only scientific output but also the opportunity to obtain
a more lucrative innovation. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our comparative
statics results indicate that a researcher spends more time developing if her discipline has
greater applicability and if the marginal utility of academic publications is lower.
We also show that the introduction of commercial incentives aﬀects not only the time
spent in research and in development but also the choice of research projects. Therefore we
are able to analyse one of the “unintended” eﬀects of the Bayh-Dole Act, which increased
the incentives to transfer university research to the market. Some groups have expressed
concerns about the possibility that academic faculty “skews” the nature of their research,
selecting applied rather than basic research projects, and therefore putting the future of
the industrial base at stake. We show that the introduction of commercial remuneration
pushes the researcher to prefer riskier projects. Given that higher levels of uncertainty
are related to more basic research, the introduction of commercial rewards might not only
preserve but also enhance the choice of more basic research projects.
Although the choice of research projects cannot be measured directly, existing indirect
evidence suggests that the much-feared switch from basic to applied research in academia
is not occurring. Thursby and Thursby (2002) conclude that changes in the direction of
faculty research seem to be relatively less important than other factors in explaining the
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increased licensing activity. Using faculty-level data from six major universities, Thursby
and Thursby (2007) find no systematic change in the proportion of publications in basic
versus applied journals between 1983 and 1999.21 They also report that the total number
of publications per faculty member more than doubled over the time period, indicating
that the number of publications in basic journals has actually increased. A decrease in
the quality of university patents could also be taken as an indication of a trend towards
more applied research. Although Henderson et al. (1998) do find a decreasing trend in
the quality of university patents (measured by the number of forward citations), Mowery
et al. (2001), Mowery at al. (2002) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) argue that this is
due to an increased number of new and inexperienced technology transfer oﬃces rather
than to a systemic change in the nature of academic research.
Our model is not only consistent with a variety of stylised facts but it also generates a
number of additional testable predictions. First, by choosing riskier projects, researchers
should be more reluctant to develop research of a low quality. Instead, they are more
willing to continue undertaking research because they are more likely to obtain results of
higher quality in the future. As a result, it might be that they end up developing less as
commercial rewards increase. Indirect evidence from this eﬀect in academia can also be
found in Thursby and Thursby (2007), who state that “the much publicized increase in
licensing activity appears to be concentrated among a minority of faculty”. Second, the
commercial value of developed projects is higher. Again, indirect evidence suggests that
most of the patenting revenues are concentrated among a reduced number of patents.
Although the level of invention disclosures, patent applications and licenses executed
increased by 84%, 238% and 161% respectively from 1991 until 2000, the royalty revenue
increased by 520% in the same period. Third, a selection of riskier projects should lead
to a more spread distribution of the quality of the publications. Empirically, one could
analyse whether the quality of the publications, measured for example in citations, of
researchers in departments in which commercial rewards are larger is more spread.
Even if it is not especially designed for, our paper could also constitute a first step
towards understanding incentive provision to the broader group of “knowledge workers”,
21Hicks and Hamilton (1999) also found that the percentage of basic research that was performed at
American universities remained unchanged between 1981 and 1995.
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such as computer programmers, engineers and technology managers, who are meant to
create, distribute, and apply knowledge across the organisation. Managers claim that
knowledge workers are the key source of growth in most organisations (see e.g., Martin
and Mondoveanu, 2003). Despite their importance, little is known about how to provide
incentives to knowledge workers.
The problem of providing scientists with incentives to commercialise is related to the
problem of inducing knowledge workers to distribute their knowledge. Incentive schemes
may be needed not only to induce them to work hard but also to induce them to allocate an
optimal amount of time between acquiring new knowledge and developing or transferring
them. As for the case of researchers, not all knowledge workers are alike. Some are better
motivated than others to perform certain tasks. Knowledge workers can be incentivised,
on the one hand, with a traditional bonus related to the performance of the firm. But, on
the other hand, it might also be possible to include rewards to the acquisition of knowledge
and the creation of new ideas. Examples include better work environments and access to
technologies and external visibility and recognition for knowledge improvement. A full
investigation of this issue is a challenging task for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The researcher will be able to sell the innovation if the value for the firm is larger than
the costs. This defines two intervals, [0, A
µ
) and [A
µ
, Q], depending on the value of q. If
q < A
µ
then the researcher will not develop for any V since she will never be able to sell
anyway, αq + δV ≥ αq + δ2V. If A
µ
≤ q ≤ Q then she will be able to sell the innovation if
she develops and therefore she will develop whenever αq + δs [µq −A] + δ2V ≤ αq + δV ,
or equivalently, when (1− δ)V ≥ s [µq −A].
Denoting m(q) ≡ s [µq −A], the previous discussion implies that, for all V , q◦(V ) is
given by m(q◦(V )) = (1 − δ)V when m(Q) > (1 − δ)V and q◦(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤
(1− δ)V. Given that m(Q) > 0 (by assumption µQ−A > 0), in order to show that there
exists a unique q◦(V ), we need to show that m(q) is an increasing function and m(0) < 0.
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Indeed, m0(q) = sµ > 0 and m(0) = −sA < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose firstly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x) + δV , which simplifying gives
V = 1
1−δαq. The decision q
◦ = Q is optimal if and only if (1− δ)V ≥ s [µQ−A], which
substituting gives αq ≥ s (µQ−A) , which corresponds to the region in case (i).
Suppose secondly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ < Q. We have that
V =
Z Q
0
αxdF (x) + δF (q◦)V + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2V,
which simplifying gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x).
On the other hand, q◦(V ) should be defined here as (1− δ)V = s [µq◦ −A]. Hence,
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) s [µq◦ −A] = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x).
Simplifying we have that q◦ is implicitly defined by
j(q◦) ≡ s (µq◦ −A)− δsµ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) = αq.
Since j0(q) = sµ+ δsµ(1− F (q)) > 0, the cut-oﬀ q◦ is unique. Finally, we need to check
that q◦ ≤ Q. Since j(q◦) = αq and j0(q) > 0, we need that j(Q) ≥ αq or s (µQ−A) ≥ αq,
which corresponds to the region in case (ii).
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this result, consider two distributions, F−(q) and F+(q), with the same support
[0, Q] and with the same mean (q), and F+(q) being a mean preserving spread of (i.e.
riskier than) F−(q). By definition,
R
u(x)dF+(x) ≥
R
u(x)dF−(x) for any u(x) defined in
R+, non-decreasing and non-concave. Given that u(x) = 0 if x [0, q] and u(x) = x− q if
x [q,Q] satisfies these conditions, we have that
R Q
q
(x− q) dF+(x) ≥
R Q
q
(x− q) dF−(x).
In other words, F−(x) second-order stochastically dominates F+(x).
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If s is small, the parameters of the model are in the region of case (i) of Proposition
2. In this region, the researcher is indiﬀerent between the two distributions. If s is high
enough, the parameters are in the region of case (ii). Given F−(q), the threshold quality
q−o is defined as:
s
¡
µq−o −A
¢
− δsµ
Z Q
q−o
¡
x− q−o
¢
dF−(x) = αq.
Since F+(.) is a mean preserving spread of F−(.), we have that
s
¡
µq−o −A
¢
− δsµ
Z Q
q−o
¡
x− q−o
¢
dF+(x) < αq.
Given that the derivative of the left hand with respect to qo1 is positive and that
s
¡
µq+o −A
¢
− δsµ
Z Q
q+o
¡
x− q+o
¢
dF+(x) = αq,
we have that q+o > q−o. As shown in the proof of the previous proposition, this implies
that V + > V − and therefore the researcher prefers the risky research project.
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove this result, suppose that there are two projects characterised by the parameters
(α1, A1) and (α2, A2), with A1 > A2 and α1 > α2, but otherwise identical. Project 1
is more basic than project 2. According to Proposition 2, we can write the discounted
present expected value for each project i = 1, 2 as
Vi(s) =
1
1− δ [s (µq
◦
i (s)−Ai)] ,
where Vi and q◦i are functions of the share s. The researcher prefers the applied project
(project 2) if and only if
q◦1(s)− q◦2(s) <
A1 −A2
µ
.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, one can show that ∂
2qo
∂s∂α
< 0 and ∂
2qo
∂s∂A
< 0. As
a consequence, q◦1(s
0) − q◦2(s0) < q◦1(s00) − q◦2(s00) whenever s0 > s00. This implies that the
researcher is more inclined to choose the applied project the larger is the share s. Indeed,
if she chooses project 2 when the share is s00, she will keep preferring that project for the
larger share s0. However, the increase in s can make the researcher switch from project 1
to project 2. The second part of the Proposition follows directly from Corollary 3.
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Proof of Lemma 6
The organisation payoﬀ B starting in a period in which research is done is equal to
B =
Z Q
0
¡
ρ− α+
¢
xdF (x) + δF (q◦)B + δ(1− s)
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2B,
where q◦ is defined in Proposition 2. Rearranging this expression we have
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])B =
¡
ρ− α+
¢
q + δ(1− s)
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x). (2)
Notice that if q◦ = Q then B = (ρ− α+) q/ (1− δ). Suppose now that q◦ < Q. From
Proposition 2 this can only happen if s > 0. From the proof of the same Proposition 2,
we have that
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x). (3)
Multiplying equation (2) by s and subtracting (1 − s) multiplied by equation (3), we
obtain
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) (sB − (1− s)V ) = s
¡
ρ− α+
¢
q − (1− s)αq,
and simplifying
B =
(1− s)
s
V +
s(ρ+ αo)− α
s (1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])q.
Proof of Proposition 7
This contract associated to the eﬃcient solution is defined by
se ≡ c
(ρ+ αo)q + δµ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x)
and α+e = se(ρ+ αo)− αo when qe < Q,
se ∈
·
0,
c
µQ−A
¸
=
·
0,
c
(ρ+ αo)q
¸
and α+e =
c
q
− αo when qe = Q.
Note that when the stopping rule that maximizes total welfare induces the commerciali-
sation of some ideas, qe < Q, there is a unique contract (α+e, se). However, when the the
stopping rule that maximizes total welfare induces no commercialisation of some ideas,
qe = Q, there is a family of contract (α+e, se) where se ∈
h
0, c
µQ−A
i
because all this shares
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induce no commercialisation (see Proposition 2), hence no income from commercialisation,
and consequently all these shares are equivalent.
Consider now the programme
max
s,α+
B
s.t. IE, s ≥ 0, s ≤ 1 and α+ ≥ 0
with q◦ defined by TA.
We distinguish two cases.
CASE (i). When c ≤ αoq the IE constraint is satisfied for any contract. The optimal
contract in this case has always α+∗ = 0, and s is the one that maximizes B given TA.
Hence, (using TA from Proposition 2),
if
dB
ds
µ
s =
αq
(µQ−A)
¶
≤ 0 then s∗ = 0 and q◦ = Q and
if
dB
ds
µ
s =
αq
(µQ−A)
¶
> 0 then 1 > s∗ > 0 and q◦ < Q.
CASE (ii). Let us consider now the situations where c > αoq. There are three
candidates:
• Case (ii.1): Assume IE binding while s ≥ 0, s ≤ 1 and α+ ≥ 0 are non-binding
If IE is binding then, substituting in B, we can rewrite B as
1
(1− δ)
Ã
(ρ+ αo)q + δ
R Q
q◦ (µx−A) dF (x)
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) − c
!
. (4)
Then B depends on (s, α+) only via q◦. The organisation chooses the optimal q◦, which
if it is an interior maximum, is equal to the point that makes the first derivative equal to
zero, i.e.
F 0(q◦)L(q◦)
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])2
= 0, (5)
where L(q◦) is defined as
(ρ+αo)q+δ
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x)−(µq◦−A) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) =
£
s(ρ+ αo)−
¡
α+ + αo
¢¤
q,
where the last equality follows from the definition of q◦(s, α+) in Proposition 2. Given
that all points have positive probability, F 0(q◦) > 0, we should have
α+ = s(ρ+ αo)− αo. (6)
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Substituting this into the TA constraint, we have that
(µq◦ −A) = (ρ+ αo)q + δµ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x).
As a result, the induced qo is chosen to maximise the sum of the researcher’s and organi-
sation’s profits, (B + V ). We denote this level as qe. Substituting qe and (6) into IE we
have
se ≡ c
(ρ+ αo)q + δµ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x)
,
and therefore α+e = se(ρ+ αo)− αo if qe < Q.
If the organisation chooses a corner solution for q◦ i.e., qe = Q, then by Proposition
2, all shares se ∈
h
0, c
µQ−A
i
=
h
0, c
(ρ+αo)q
i
are equivalent and α+e = c
q
− αo. This covers
the case in which s = 0 is binding.
It only remains to show that the second derivative is negative. The sign of the second
derivative is equal to the sign of
[F 00(q◦)L(q◦) + F 0(q◦)L0(q◦)] (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) + 2δF 0(q◦)F 0(q◦)L(q◦)
given that at qo = qe we have that L(qe) = 0, this is equal to
F 0(q◦)L0(q◦) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) .
and therefore the sign is equivalent to the sign of L0(q◦), which is equal to
−µ (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) < 0.
This case is well defined if se ≤ 1, α+e ≥ 0.
• Case (ii.2): Assume c > (ρ+ αo)q + δµ R Q
qe (x− q
e) dF (x) (i.e., se > 1)
Then if IE is binding the candidate for solution is
s = 1 and α+ =
c− δµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q
◦) dF (x)
q
− αo
Note that α+ ≥ 0, since αoq + δµ
R Q
qo (x− q
o) dF (x) ≤ c is implied by c > (ρ+ αo)q +
δµ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x) and the fact that q◦ > qe.
Finally, we have that s = 1 while IE is non-binding is not a candidate for solution.
By Corollary 3 we know that it is possible to keep q◦ constant by decreasing s and α+
and this will increase B.
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• Case (ii.3): Assume c ≤ (ρ + αo)q + δµ R Q
qe (x− q
e) dF (x) (i.e., se ≤ 1) and c <
αoq +
δµ
R Q
qe(x−q
e)dF (x)
(ρ+αo) , (i.e., α
+e < 0)
If IE is still binding the candidate for solution is
α+ = 0 and s =
c− αoq
δµ
R Q
qo (x− qo) dF (x)
< se
note that s ≥ 0 because c ≥ αoq, and s ≤ 1 because here α+e < α+ and therefore s < se
which in this case is smaller or equal than one.
If IE is not binding the solution is the one that
max
s
B
s.t. s ≥ c− α
oq
δµ
R Q
qo (x− qe) dF (x)
, s ≤ 1 and α+ = 0
with q◦ defined by TA.
Proof of Proposition 8
At t = 1 the researcher does research and obtains at the end of the period q1 and A1. She
has to decide whether to do research or development during t = 2. If she chooses to look
for a new idea she obtains at the end of the second period, q2 and A2 and a payoﬀ of α2q2.
At this point, she would have to decide whether to do research again at t = 3, obtaining
α3q3 at the end of it or development obtaining s3(µq2 −A2). If instead she decides to do
development at t = 2 she obtains s2(µq1 −A1) at the end of the second and α30q30 at the
end of t = 3. In summary the ex-post payoﬀs are if she chooses to do research in the
second and the third,
α1q1 + δα2q2 + δ
2α3q3,
if, instead she decides to do research in the second and development in the third, she
obtains
α1q1 + δα2q2 + δ
2s3(µq2 −A2),
and finally, if she decides to commercialise in the second (and therefore do research in the
third), she obtains
α1q1 + δs2(µq1 −A1) + δ2α30q30 .
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Solving the game by backward induction, the researcher will decide to develop in the
last period if and only if
s3(q2 + a2) ≥ α30q30 . (7)
Define for every q2 the level bA2(q2) as the one that satisfies s2 ³µq2 − bA2(q2)´ = αq30 ,
with bA2(q2) increasing in q2. Going backwards, she will develop in the second period if
and only if
s2(µq1−A1) ≥ α2q2−δα30q30+δ
Z Q
0
Z bA2(x)
A2
s3(µx−y)dH2(y)dG2(x)+δα3q3
Z Q
0
(1−H2( bA2(x))dG2(x).
Proof of Corollary 9
In the stationary environment, the stopping rule after the second period of research is
s(µq2 −A2) = αq, (8)
and when distributions are stationary, then we can rearrange the terms of the first period
stopping rule as
s(µq1 −A1) = αq + δ
Z Q
0
Z bA2(x)
A2
[s(µx− y)− αq] dH(y)dG(x). (9)
Since by definition the function in the integral is positive in that domain, we have that
the left hand side is higher in (9) than in (8) and therefore the researcher is less likely to
develop (for the same realised q and A) in the second period than in the third.
Proof of Proposition 10
If Ai ≡ 0 and µ = 1 we have that the stopping rule in the first and second periods are
defined by qo1 and q
o
2, where
s2q
o
1 + δα3q¯3 = α2q2 + δs3
Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2)dG2(x) + δα30q30 and qo2 =
α30q30
s3
and
V = α1q1 + δs2q
o
1 + δ
2α3q¯3 + δs2
Z Q
qo1
(x− qo1)dG1(x). (11)
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A mean preserving spread of eq1 implies an increase in the integral term of V and has
no eﬀect on qo2 and q
o
1. Hence, it increases V . A mean preserving spread of eq2, increases
the integral in the first period time allocation. As a result qo1 increases and given that
∂V
∂qo1
= δG1(qo1)s2µ > 0,
we have that it also increases V . This completes the first part of the proof.
Let us denote G+i (q) and G
−
i (q) two distribution functions, in which the first is a mean
preserving spread of the second. In this case we have that V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢
is equal to
δs2
Z Q
qo1(G
+
1 )
(x− qo1
¡
G+1
¢
)dG+1 (x)− δs2
Z Q
qo1(G
−
1 )
(x− qo1
¡
G−1
¢
)dG−1 (x),
and V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢
equal to
δs2
Ã
qo1
¡
G+2
¢
+
Z Q
qo1(G
+
2 )
(x− qo1
¡
G+2
¢
)dG1(x)− qo1
¡
G−2
¢
−
Z Q
qo1(G
−
2 )
(x− qo1
¡
G−2
¢
)dG1(x)
!
.
Suppose that we take a mean preserving spread of G1(q). In this case qo1
¡
G+1
¢
=
qo1
¡
G−1
¢
. An increase in s2 increases the incentives to take more risk, given that
∂
£
V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢¤
∂s2
= δ
·Z qo1
0
xdG−1 (x)−
Z qo1
0
xdG+1 (x)
¸
> 0.
But, if we increase s3 we have that
∂
£
V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢¤
∂s3
= δ2
£
G+1 (q
o
1)−G−1 (qo1)
¤ Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2)dG2(x),
whose sign coincides with the sign of G+1 (q
o
1)−G−1 (qo1). Given that one is a mean preserv-
ing spread of the other we have that G+1 (q
o
1)−G−1 (qo1) > 0 if and only if qo1 > q¯1.
Suppose now that we take a mean preserving spread of G2(q). In this case qo1
¡
G+2
¢
>
qo1
¡
G−2
¢
. Simplifying, we have that an increase in s2, decreases V
¡
G+2
¢
−V
¡
G−2
¢
. Indeed,
simplifying, we have that
∂
£
V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢¤
∂s2
= δ
Z Q
qo1(G
+
2 )
xdG1(x)− δ
Z Q
qo1(G
−
2 )
xdG1(x) < 0,
whereas the derivative of V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢
with respect to s3 is equal to
δ2G1(qo1
¡
G+2
¢
)
Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2)dG+2 (x)− δ2G1(qo1
¡
G−2
¢
)
Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2)dG−2 (x)
and this is greater than 0 because qo1
¡
G+2
¢
> qo1
¡
G−2
¢
.
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